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Summary  findings
Manufacturing  firms  in developing  countries  have  economies  are modest,  and convincing  demonstrations  of
traditionally  been  relatively  protected.  They  have also  monopoly  rents are generally  lacking.
been subject  to heavy  regulation,  much of it biased in  Overprotection  and overreguiation  are probably  less  a
favor of large enterprises.  Accordingly,  it is often argued  problem  in developing  countries  than are uncertainty
that manufacturers  in these  countries  perform poorly  in  about policies  and demand,  poor rule of law, and
several  respects:  corruption.
* Markets  tolerate inefficient  firms,  so cross-firm  Tybout does find some evidence  that protection
productivity  dispersion  is high.  increases  firms' price-cost  margins  and reduces  average
* Small  groups of entrenched  oligopolists  exploit  efficiency  levels  at the margin.
monopoly  power in product markets.  And although  the econometric  evidence  on technology
* Many small  firms are unable or unwilling  to grow,  diffusion  in developing  countries  is limited,  it does
so important economies  of scale  go unexploited.  suggest  that protecting  "learning"  industries  is unlikely  to
Tybout assesses  each of these conjectures,  drawing  on  foster productivity  growth.
plant- and firm-level  studies  of manufacturers  in  All of which suggests  that the general  trend toward
developing  countries.  He finds  systematic  support  for  trade liberalization  has yielded  greater  benefits  than the
none of them. Turnover  is substantial,  exploited  scale  traditional  gains  from trade.
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tions.I.  OVERVIEW
The manufacturing sector is often the darling of policy makers in less developed
countries (LDCs).  It is viewed as the leading edge of modernization and skilled job crea-
tion, as well as a fundamental source of various positive spillovers. Accordingly, al-
though many LDCs have scaled back trade barriers over the past 20 years, the industrial
sector remains relatively protected in the typical country (Schiff and Valdez, 1992, chap-
ter 2; Erzan, et al, 1989; Ng, 1997).1 Governments also promote manufacturing with
special tax concessions, and relatively low tariff rates for importers of manufacturing ma-
chinery and equipment.
At the same time, many observers believe that the maze of business regulations is
unusually dense and unpredictable in LDCs.2 Summarizing an extensive survey of mana-
gerial attitudes around the world, Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997) report that LDC
firms generally consider the institutional obstacles to doing business more burdensome
than their OECD cotmterparts. The regulatory problems that they view as more severe
include price controls, regulations on foreign trade, foreign currency regulations, tax
regulations and/or high taxes, policy instability, and general uncertainty regarding the
costs of regulation. Other types of regulation-including  business licensing and labor
' The need  for revenue  is a second  motivation  for relatively  high tariffs  in developing  countries,  although
non-tariff  barriers  seldorn  serve  this function.
2A  well-known  example  of the problem  was generated  by the Institute  for Liberty  and Democracy  in Peru,
which  attempted  to register  a fictitious  clothing  factory  in the mid-1  980s.  "To register  the imaginary  fac-
tory took  289 days and  required  the full-time  labor  of the group  assigned  to the task, as well  as ..  .the
equivalent  of 23 minimum  monthly  wages"  (de Soto, 1989,  p. xiv).
2laws-are  not viewed  as especially  burdensome  on average  in the LDCs, but constitute
major problems  in certain  developing  countries. 3
Moreover,  within  the manufacturing  sector,  it is also often  argued  that policies
favor large firms  while  inhibiting  growth  among  small firms.  In some  cases, investment
incentives  are available  only to projects  above a minimum  scale, and large scale produc-
ers are singled  out for special  subsidies. 4 Even  when policies  do not explicitly  favor  large
firms,  they may benefit  relatively  more from trade protection,  both because  their products
compete  more directly  with imports,  and because  sectors  with large,  capital-intensive
firms  lobby the government  more  effectively.  The bias against  small entrepreneurs  is ex-
acerbated  when financial  repression  is a problem,  since  credit  rationing  typically  excludes
the smallest  borrowers  first (Levine,  1997;  Little, 1987;  Tybout, 1984).  Finally, large
firns are typically  better able  to absorb  the fixed  costs of dealing  with dense  regulatory
regimes.
These basic tendencies  in LDCs-toward  industrial  sector  promotion,  dense,  un-
predictable  regulatory  regimes,  and within industry,  toward  favoring  large-scale  enter-
prises-raise  a number  of fundamental  empirical  issues.  First, do the regulatory  regimes
and the bias against  small  producers  prevent small firms  from growing,  and thereby cre-
3 There  were no major  differences  between  the LDCs  and OECD  in terms of the regulations  concerning
new business  start-ups  or safety  and environmental  standards;  further,  LDC  firms viewed  labor  regulations
as less  of a problem  than did OECD  firms.  But licensing  and labor  laws have  been flagged  as major  prob-
lems in India  and some  Latin American  countries,  inter alia.  For country-specific  discussions  of the regula-
tory burden,  see de Soto (1989)  on Peru; World  Bank  (1995a)  and Biggs  and Srivastava  (1996)  on  Sub-
Saharan  Africa;  Little,  Mazumdar  and Page (1987) and Pursell  (1990)  on India. Severance  laws  in develop-
ing countries  are discussed  in (World  Bank, 1995b,  Chap.  4), and in more  detail for the Latin American
case in Cox-Edwards  (1993).
4See  Pack and Westphal,  1986  on Korea;  Cortes,  et al (1987)  on Colombia;  Wade  (1990) and Bruch  and
Hiemenz  (1984)  on E.  Asia. India  is an exception-see, for example,  Little  et al (1987).
3ate losses due to unexploited  scale economies? Second,  if these  regimes  prevent  small
firms  from threatening  the larger  incumbents,  do LDC industries  lack dynamism  and
competition?  That is, have  entrenched  oligopolies  emerged  that are neither innovative,
technically  efficient,  nor likely  to price competitively?  Finally,  has trade protection  com-
pounded  the technical  inefficiencies  and monopoly  power  that arise from regulatory  re-
gimes?  In this paper I selectively  take stock of what we have learned  about  these issues
from firm-  and plant;-level  econometric  studies  over the past decade.
These are difficult  questions.  One fundamental  reason  is that the effects  of indus-
trial sector  policies  are intertwined  with the effects  of other features  of the business  envi-
ronment in LDCs. Typically,  product  markets  are small,  access  to manufactured  inputs is
limited,  human  capital  is scarce,  infrastructure  is poor, financial  markets  are thin, macro
volatility  is high,  the legal system  functions  poorly, and corruption  and property  crimes
are relatively  common.  A second  reason is that information  on the producers  themselves
is very limited. Detailed  studies  of producer  turnover,  pricing behavior,  efficiency  and
spillover  effects  exist,  but their coverage  is sporadic,  and many empirical  issues  remain
completely  unexplored.
Nonetheless,  the evidence  provides  a much  better  basis for generalization  than it
did 20 years ago. I shall  begin by briefly  reviewing  some  of the distinctive  features  of the
environment  in which  LDC manufacturers  operate.  This will serve  as background  to the
discussion  that follows,  and help to distinguish  differences  in the performance  of LDC
manufacturers  that trace to structural  differences  in their economies  rather than  to the
policies  designed  to influence  their behavior.  Next, drawing  on the available  evidence,  I
4will take up the issue of whether  small firms  have been somehow  suppressed,  and more
generally,  whether  the LDC business  environment  in LDCs has bred non-competitive
pricing  behavior  and low productivity.  Finally,  I will address  the question  of how  trade
protection  has conditioned  pricing,  efficiency,  and productivity  growth.
II.  THE BUSINESS  ENVIRONMENT: WHAT'S DIFFERENT IN LDCs?
A variety  of features  distinguish  the business  environment  in developing  countries
from  those typically  observed  in the OECD. At the risk of over-simplifying,  I will begin
by mentioning  the most striking  and widely  acknowledged  among  them.
Market  size: Although  some  developing  economies  are quite large,  most are not.
Hence,  excepting  countries  like Brazil,  China, India  and Indonesia,  the size of the do-
mestic  market  for manufactured  products  is relatively  limited  (figure 1).  Further,  among
the least developed  countries,  Engel effects  favor  basic subsistence  needs over all but the
most basic  manufactured  products  (figure  2). So when transport  costs are significant  and
the OECD  countries  are distant,  demand  for the more sophisticated  manufactured  goods
is small.
Access to manufactured inputs: The menu of domestically  produced  intermediate
inputs  and capital  equipment  is also often limited  in developing  countries.  Thus producers
who  might easily have acquired  specialized  inputs if they were operating  in an OECD
country  must either  make do with imperfect  substitutes  or import  the needed  inputs at
extra  expense. Indeed,  the vast majority  of machinery  and equipment  deployed  in devel-
oping  countries  is imported.
5Human capital  Low rates of secondary education and a scarcity of technicians
and scientists also aifect the mix of goods manufactured and the factor proportions used
to produce them.5 Similarly, many have argued that flexibility in production processes
and the ability to absorb new technologies is directly related to the stock of indigenous
human capital (e.g., Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Evenson and Westphal, 1995; Keller,
1996).
Infrastructure  Roads, ports, airports, communication facilities, power, and safe
water access also tend to be relatively limited in LDCs (World Bank, 1994, figure 1, p. 3,
table 1.  1, p. 13, and figure 1.  1, p. 14). Production techniques are directly affected, and so
are the costs of servicing distant markets. Poor transportation networks are particularly
limiting in the least developed, more agrarian economies, where consumers are spread
throughout the courntryside. In instances where infrastructure services are missing or un-
reliable, some firms must produce their own power, transport and/or communication
services.
Financial markets  Credit markets are also relatively thin, and heavily skewed to-
ward short-term instruments.  Excepting some of the newly industrialized countries, stock
markets are nearly irrelevant as a source of new equity funds (Levine, 1997, table 4). The
financing constraint binds especially for small firms, which are relatively likely to fail,
and which banks find relatively costly to service per unit of funds lent.6
5 The wages  of scientists  and engineers  in manufacturing  firms  constitute  0.2 percent  of GDP in the most
technologically  primiti  ve of the developing  countries,  while the account  for 1.0  percent  of GDP in  the
OECD  (Evenson  and Westphal,  1995,  table 37.1).  A logarithmic  regression  of the secondary  school  en-
rollment  rate  on GDP  per capita  yields an elasticity  of 0.62 and an R-squared  of 0.65. (Data  are taken from
Barro's data base, EVIEWS  version,  and describe  1  18 countries.)
6Levine  (1997)  provides  references.
6Volatility  Macroeconomic  and  relative  price volatility  is typically  more extreme  in
developing  countries.  Latin  America  and Sub-Saharan  Africa  stand out among  the devel-
oping  countries  as the most volatile,  but all developing  regions do worse  than the indus-
trialized  countries  (The World  Bank, 1993;  Hausmann  and Gavin 1996).
Governance  Finally,  legal systems  and crime  prevention  are also relatively  poor in
developing  countries,  and corruption  is often a serious  problem  (World  Bank, 1997;  Bru-
netti et al, 1997).  Hence  the protection  of property  rights and contract  enforcement  can be
problematic.  Anti-trust  policy  is also often weak,  as are environmental  standards
(Brunetti  et al, 1997).
III.  PLANT SIZES AND SCALE EFFICIENCY
Combined  with industrial  sector  policies,  the above circumstances  (and others  I
have neglected  to mention)  lead  to several  distinctive  features  of LDC manufacturing
sectors.  Perhaps  the most striking  of these is their dualism.  Side by side, large  numbers  of
micro enterprises  and a handful  modern,  large scale factories  often  produce  similar  prod-
ucts. The small producers  frequently  operate  partly or wholly outside  the realm  of gov-
ernment  regulation,  and rely heavily  on informal  credit  markets  and internal  funds for fi-
nance. They  are relatively  labor intensive,  so they account  for a larger share  of employ-
ment than of output.
A.  The Size  Distribution
The contrast  between  the size distribution  of plants in developing  countries  and
that found  in the OECD  is dramatic. Table 1 provides  some  crude  comparisons.  Note that
7there is a large spike in the size distribution for the size class 1-4 workers, and it drops off
quickly in the 10-49 category among the poorest countries. This is not true in the United
States or other industrialized countries. The emphasis on small scale production not only
correlates negatively with per capita income levels across countries (Liedholm and Mead,
1987, p. 16, Banerji, 1978), but also within countries through time (Little, et al, 1987;
Steel, 1993). Further, the prevalence of micro enterprises is substantially understated be-
cause many are invisible to official census takers.7
What accounts for this phenomenon? Part of the explanation is that the tax and
regulatory regimes create incentives to evade government detection (de Soto, 1989).
Rauch (1991) stresses that firms graduating from small, informal status show up on the
radar screens of regulators and tax collectors and suffer the consequences. Further, in
some cases the "missing middle" of the size distribution has been attributed to policies
that explicitly punish small firms for graduating to the medium-sized ranks. 8 On India,
which is unusual in the favoritism it has shown to small firms, Little et al (1987, p. 32)
write: "Not only would small firms [that graduate] have to cope with a much more diffi-
cult licensing policy, but they would also have to contend with higher labor costs
(including wages and fringe benefits as laid down by labor laws) and substantially higher
excise duties."
7Many  do not have  postal  boxes, are impermanent,  and/or  are part of farm compounds.  "[C]omparison  of
village  by village  enterprise  censuses  conducted  by [Michigan  State  University]  and local scholars  with
'official' censuses  shows  that  the latter  not infrequently  undercounted  the number  of enterprises  by a factor
of two or more."  (Leidholm  and Mead, 1987,  p. 20)
aIn an unusually  detailed  study  of evasion  and exemption  patterns,  Gauthier  and Gersovitz  (1997)  show
that  medium-sized  firms  bear the brunt of the tax burden  in Cameroon.  The reason  is that  small firms  op-
erate in the informal  sector,  while large  firms  are influential  enough  to obtain  special  treatment.
8But underdevelopment in itself is likely to skew the size distribution toward small
firms, regardless of the policy regime. One reason is geography. As noted in section II,
the poorest countries tend to be the least urbanized, and transportation networks tend to
be underdeveloped.  So small, diffuse pockets of demand lead to small scale, localized
production.9 In many countries a majority of the small scale producers are located in ru-
ral areas.  Also, "farm and non-farm employment often move in opposite directions over
the year and are quite complementary" (Liedholm and Mead, 1987, p. 28). Many of the
micro enterprises in very poor countries are created as a last resort by people in need of
income (Liedholm and Mead, 1995). Thus creation rates are often counter-cyclical, al-
though this need not hold in urban centers (Maloney, 1997).
A second reason is that Engel effects skew demand for manufactured products
toward simple items like baked goods, apparel, footwear, metal products, and furniture.
All of these products can be efficiently produced using cottage technologies, so there is
little incentive to consolidate production in several large plants and incur the extra distri-
bution costs.
Further, in cases where multiple technologies are available for a single product,
plentiful unskilled labor and the lack of long term finance create incentives to economize
on fixed capital.  Since most machinery and equipment must be imported, the trade re-
9 Liedholm and Mead  (1987) report that "in the four survey countries where relevant data were collected,
direct sales to final consumers dominated [sales to businesses, government sales and exports], and, in fact,
exceeded  80 percent in three  of the  countries."  (pp. 46-47)
9gime and the lack of local technical support may further militate against factory produc-
tion in small markets.! 
Volatility in the business environment-both  regulatory and macroeconomic-
has similar consequences. Investments in fixed capital involve long-term commitments to
particular products and production volumes.  If there is substantial uncertainty about fu-
ture demand conditions for these products, it often makes sense to choose production
techniques that do not lock one in; that is, to rely more heavily on labor (Lambson, 1991;
Brunetti et al, 1997).
B.  Are small firms scale efficient?
Does the preponderance of small firms imply that scale inefficiency is a serious
problem in developing countries? Many have argued that it does, particularly in the
simulation literature, where analysts often assume that the ratio of average to marginal
cost is above 1.10 for the typical plant.'I  However, survey-based evidence suggests that
the potential efficiency gains from increases in plant size-induced,  for example, by trade
liberalization-are  probably much smaller than these studies suggest.
The evidence on firms with less than 10 workers is very limited because data are
difficult to come by. Even when surveys are available, the boundaries of these enterprises
are often hard to define because they are part of a household or a farm, or because they
10  Cortes  et al (1987, pp. 153-154)  note that "ithe  increasing  availability  of skill  machine  operators  [in Co-
lombia]  has also contributed  to the establishment  of local importers  and reconstructors  of used equipment.
For example,  Devarajan  and  Rodrik  (1991)  assume  a ratio of 1.25  for Cameroonian  manufacturing,
Brown,  Deardorff  and Stern  (1991) assume  a ratio  of 1.33 for most Mexican  manufacturing  industries,  and
de Melo  and Roland-Holst  (199  1) assume  ratios varying  between  1.  10 and 1.20  for the Republic  of Korea.
Further details  are provided  in Tybout  and Westbrook  (1996).
10are vertically  integrated  with non-manufacturing  activities.  Nonetheless,  the available
studies challenge  the notion that unexploited  scale  economies  are a major potential  source
of efficiency  gains.
The simplest  studies  relate output  per worker  and output  per unit capital  to scale.
As Little (1987)  notes,  these studies  often  treat broadly-defined  industries,  making infer-
ences  problematic.  But among  four narrowly-defined  Indian industries,  Little,  Mazumdar
and Page (1987)  find that "it is difficult  to detect  any systematic  variation  in labor or
capital  productivity  with firm  size." (p. 186)
Studies  of micro enterprises  that attempt  multi-factor  productivity  measures  have
often used variants  of the social  cost-benefit  ratio, constructed  as the cost of labor  and
capital  at shadow  prices, relative  to value-added  in world  prices.12  As discussed  by Leid-
holm and Mead (1987),  these studies  have differed  in their conclusions,  with some  find-
ing that small  enterprises  are at least as efficient  as others,  and others  finding  their effi-
ciency  relatively  low. 13 As for the very  small,  Liedholm  and Mead  (1987)  do find that
one-person  establishments  are systematically  less efficient  than others,  perhaps  because
many  are created  as occupations  of last resort  for those  who cannot  find work in the job
market.
12 This  measure  is closely  related  to efficiency  measures  based on residuals  from constant  returns  produc-
tion functions  or cost functions.  The two approaches  differ mainly  in  the functional  form they use  to aggre-
gate capital and labor  into an index of factor  usage.
'3 Leidholm  and Mead (1987)  find that small  enterprises  in Sierra  Leone,  Honduras  and Jamaica  are at least
as efficient  as others. On the other  hand, Ho (1980)  and Cortes,  et al (1987) find some  evidence  of scale
economies  in Korea and Colombia,  respectively.  Small  enterprises  are typically  less  capital  intensive,  so
one reason  for the discrepancy  may be that Leidholm  and Mead  use a rather  high shadow  price of 20 per-
cent per annum  for capital  services.
11There have also been some attempts to econometrically estimate production tech-
nologies among small firms in developing countries. Little et al (1987) and Ramaswamy
(1994) fit production functions to cross-sectional data on small-scale Indian producers,
and report returns to scale very close to unity in all of the industries they treat.  Hill and
Kalijaran (1993) obtain analogous results among small-scale Indonesian garment produc-
ers. Similarly, using firm-level African data collected by the Regional Program on Enter-
prise Development (RPED), Biggs et al (1995) fit the same estimator to four manufactur-
ing sectors in Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe.  Interestingly, even when the sample is lim-
ited to firms with 3 to 20 workers, they estimate returns to scale are very close to unity.
And when the entire stratified sample is used for each industry (covering the entire size
spectrum), returns to scale are still close to unity in food and textiles/garments, while
mild increasing returns are found in wood products and metal products.'4
Finally, a larger number of studies have econometrically estimated returns to scale
using data on plants with at least 10 workers. These have found constant or mildly in-
creasing returns (between 1.05 and 1.  10) in the various manufacturing sectors of Latin
American, Asian, and North African countries.'5
It is fair to say that all of these studies are plagued by measurement error prob-
lems, omitted variables, aggregation bias, and simultaneity bias (Tybout and Westbrook,
14 This  is all the more remarkable  when one considers  that inherently  inefficient  firms tend to stay small,  so
even  in the absence  of scale  economies  the data should  exhibit  some correlation  between  size and produc-
tivity due  to selection  effects  (e.g., Olley and Pakes, 1996).
15  See Pitt and Lee (1981)  o:n  Indonesia;  Fikkert  and Hassan  (1996)  on India, Page (1984)  on India, Tybout
and Westbrook  (1995) on Mexico,  Westbrook  and Tybout  (1993)  on Chile,  Tybout  (1992) on Chile,  Ait-
ken and Harrison  (1994) on Venezuela,  Lee  and Tyler  (1978) on Brazil,  Haddad  and Harrison  (1993) on
Morocco,  Chen and Tang  (1987)  on Taiwan,  and Aw and Hwang  (1995) on Taiwan.
121996;  Levinsohn  and Petrin, 1997;  Tybout 1992a).  Nonetheless,  their basic message
seems  consistent  with engineering  studies: the efficiency  costs of being small are not
crippling-if present  at all-once  the one-worker  threshold  has been  traversed. Put dif-
ferently,  small firms  in developing  countries  tend not to locate in those industries  where
they would  be at a substantial  cost disadvantage  relative  to larger  incumbents.
IV.  BARRIERS  TO ENTRY AND GROWTH  IN THE LDCs
Even if the potential  gains  from scale economy  exploitation  are small,  one might
argue  that the prominence  of small-scale  producers  in LDCs is symptomatic  of other
problems. For example,  excessive  taxation  and regulation  might keep  many firms small
and informal,  thereby stanching  the selection  process  through  which  better  managers
and/or  technologies  gain market  share  (e.g.,  de Soto, 1989).16  Severance  laws and restric-
tions on the use of temporary  workers  may also inhibit  the expansion  and contraction  of
plants, limiting  competitive  pressures.  Similarly,  producer  turnover  may be dampened  by
policies  that prop up "sick" firms,  thereby  saturating  the market  with inefficient  produc-
ers,  and discouraging  better  firms  from entering.17  Poorly  functioning  credit  markets  may
firther inhibit  entry and expansion  because  they ration small  businesses  and potential  en-
trepreneurs  without  collateral.
16 Of  course,  taxation  and  regulation  are  not inefficient  per se.  As  Levenson  and  Maloney  (1997) note,
firms  that  register  with  tax  authorities  and  regulators  also  enjoy  the benefits  of enforceable  contracts,  better
access  to credit,  and-in the  form  of publicly  administered  fringe  benefits  for  workers-access  to risk-
pooling  mechanisms.
17Pursell  (1990)  notes  that  "sick"  enterprises  propped  up  by the  Indian  government  tied  up  roughly  14  per-
cent  of total  bank  credit  to industry  in 1986.  Fikkert  and  Hasan  (1996)  review  the  various  licensing  re-
quiremnents  and approval  procedures  for capacity  expansion  that  have prevailed  in India, and provide  fur-
ther  references.
13A.  Analytical  Models  of Industrial  Evolution
What might constitute evidence on these relatively subtle effects?  Formal models
of industrial evolution provide some guidance. These models generally include represen-
tations of the processes that generates each firm's entry, exit, productivity growth, and
market share or factor use. In most modem treatments, each dimension of performance is
depicted as the optimal behavior of forward-looking entrepreneurs with rational expecta-
tions but limited information. 8
The literature is complex, but Hopenhayn (1992) provides a relatively tractable
formulation. In his model, firms differ only in terms of their productivity levels, each of
which evolves according to an exogenous Markov process. New firms enter when the
distribution from which they draw their initial productivity level is sufficiently favorable
that their expected future profit stream, net of annual fixed costs, will cover the sunk
costs of entry. Firms exit when they experience a series of adverse productivity shocks,
driving their expected future operating profits sufficiently low that exit is their least
costly option. All firms are price takers, but the prices of their inputs and outputs depend
upon the number of active firms and their productivity levels.
This model shares a number of implications with other representations of indus-
trial evolution developed by Jovanovic (1982) and Ericson and Pakes (1995). At any
point in time, an entire distribution of firms with different sizes, ages and productivity
is  Nelson and Winters  (198:2)  argue that  managers  do not have  the sophistication  or the information  to
solve stochastic  dynamic  optimization  problems,  so these  authors  model  entry,  growth  and exit as deriving
from rules of thumb  that  managers  follow.  The assumption  of relentlessly  optimal  behavior  is doubtless  a
charicature  of the real world,  but it is not obvious  that alternative  representations  of behavior  are more
defensible.  I will couch  my discussion  in terms of the writings  of the optimizing  literature.
14levels coexists, and simultaneous entry and exit is the norm. Young firms have not yet
survived a shakedown process, so they tend to be smaller and to exit more frequently.
Large firms are the most efficient, on average, so their mark-ups are the largest. Nonethe-
less, despite all the heterogeneity, equilibria in both Jovanovic's and Hopenhayn's model
maximize the net discounted value of social surplus. Thus market interventions-like
artificial entry barriers, severance laws, or policies that prop up dying firms-generally
make matters worse.19
Under certain regularity conditions, Hopenhayn shows that an increase in the sunk
costs of entry protects incumbent firms from the upward pressure on input prices and the
downward pressure on output prices that new entrants create. Thus high entry costs not
only reduce the amount of entry, they encourage incumbents with relatively low produc-
tivity to stick around, and thereby increase the amount of productivity dispersion among
active firms.20  In addition, the market shares of the largest, most efficient firms rise with
entry costs (Hopenhayn, 1992, p. 1142). The shares of the largest firms also respond
negatively to market size, since an outward shift in demand scales the entire plant size
distribution up or down, without changing its shape or the underlying entry/exit proc-
21 esses.
19  Product  markets  are  not perfectly  competitive  in Ericson  and  Pakes  (1995)  so  this statement  does  not
hold  for  that  model.
20 Exit  costs  have  qualitatively  similar  effects  to those  of sunk  entry  costs  because  they  reduce  the  amount
of one's  initial  investment  that  can  be recovered  by  quitting  the  industry.
21 For example,  if one doubles  demand,  concentration  ratios drop by a factor  of 2 and Herfmdahl  indices
drop  by a factor  of 4, but turnover  rates and the market  shares  of each quantile  in the size distribution  re-
main unchanged.
15Policies that inhibit expansion or contraction have similar consequences. Using a
variant on the model described above, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) simulate the ef-
fects severance laws.  They find that increases in the rate at which laid off workers must
be compensated increase the degree of persistence in firms' market shares, increase aver-
age firm size, increase price-cost mark-ups, reduce average productivity, and reduce the
job turnover rate.
In light of these results, does the evidence suggest that policies inhibit turnover
processes relatively more in developing countries, and that industrial efficiency suffers in
consequence? In addition to studies of the size distribution of firms, at least three empiri-
cal literatures bear on this question. The first summarizes the extent of productivity dis-
persion, usually in thte  context of efficiency frontier estimation. The second, relatively
recent literature documents the extent of plant turnover, and in some cases relates this
turnover to productivity growth. Finally, an older literature on industrial concentration is
potentially relevant. 'Let us take each in turn.
B.  Is Productivity Dispersion Higher in LDCs?
In the development literature, formal models of industrial evolution are rarely in-
voked. Nonetheless, many analysts have studied the amount of productivity dispersion in
LDCs. A sampling of results is presented in Tables 2 and 3, and compared to those from a
recent multi-country study of the OECD.
Each study is done by estimating the "frontier" production technology, which de-
fines the maximum amount of output, y*, attainable from a given input bundle, x: y* =
f(x).  Then, for observed combinations of output and inputs at the i  plant (yi, xi), the ra-
16tio yi / f(xj) is interpreted either as an efficiency index itself, or as an efficiency index
contaminated by measurement error and transitory shocks beyond the control of plant
managers. These two approaches are known as the "deterministic frontier" and the
"stochastic frontier" approach, respectively. 22 Cross-plant mean efficiency levels, and
standard deviations in efficiency levels are the most commonly reported summary meas-
ures of an industry's performance. These bear a negative monotonic relationship to one
another in most cases, so I report only the former.
Some caveats are in order.  First, these studies are done at differing levels of ag-
gregation. One would expect that the finer the industry, the less dispersion due to pooling
heterogeneous technologies. Second, there are differing degrees of measurement error in
outputs and inputs. Moreover, most studies describe output in terms of revenue rather
than physical product, blurring the distinction between factor productivity and market
power. Third, as is well known, the results depend to a large degree upon whether sto-
chastic or deterministic frontiers are used, and upon the assumed distribution of the error
terms (Corbo and de Melo, 1986).
Finally, unless they are estimated with panel data, stochastic frontier models sepa-
rate technical inefficiency from noise by treating  ln[yi / f(xi)] as the sum of two orthogo-
nal error components-one  reflecting inefficiency and the other reflecting measurement
error or shocks beyond the control of managers. Typically, the negative of the ineffi-
22 The  literature  can  be further  sub-divided  according  to whether  f(xi)  is estimated  parametrically  or  non-
parametrically  (known  as "data  envelopment  analysis"),  and  whether  econometric  or programming  tech-
niques  are used. Greene  (1993) provides  a recent  summary  of the various  approaches  to efficiency  meas-
urement.
17ciency  component  (hereafter  denoted u) is assumed  to have a half-normal,  gamma  or ex-
ponential  distribution,  and the noise component  is assumed  to have a normal  distribution.
Greater  skewness-measured by the negative  of the third moment  of the compound  er-
ror-thus  implies  more productivity  dispersion.  However,  the data often  imply that the
distribution  of In[  yi / f(x,)] is skewed  in a way that is inconsistent  with these assump-
tions, so in practice many  industries  do not fit the model. Such industries  are typically
dropped  from the analysis,  and the reported  average  efficiency  levels are based  only on
the industries  that remain.
To control  for differences  in methodology,  I have sorted  studies  according  to
whether  they presume  deterministic  or stochastic  frontiers,  and wherever  possible,  in the
latter  case I have used the results  based  upon the half-normal  distribution  for the effi-
ciency  component  of the error term. Among  the deterministic  frontier studies,  there is still
some  variation  in the methodologies  across  studies  because  some  use linear  programming
to identify  the production  function  while  others use quadratic  programming. More impor-
tantly, some  (like Page, 1980)  impose  a distribution  on the efficiency  measures  while
others do not.
The deterministic  frontier studies  (Table  2) generally  yield lower  average  effi-
ciency  levels than the stochastic  frontier  studies  (Table 3), since  the former  attribute  all
unexplained  variation  in y to inefficiency.  Unfortunately,  they  are also very sensitive  to
the specific  assumptions  behind  the calculations,  and do not appear  to convey  any clear
messages. Notice,  for example,  that Corbo  and de Melo's (1986)  deterministic  frontier
results  imply that Chile  was very inefficient  relative  to other  countries,  but their stochas-
18tic frontier  results imply Chile was average.  Given  this sensitivity,  as well as the lack of
good comparator  studies  from industrialized  countries,  I shall  hereafter  focus on the sto-
chastic frontier  results.
A comparison  of the LDC  results in Table 3 with those  from industrialized  coun-
tries (listed  under  Caves, 1995)  yields a surprising  message. It is often observed  that the
cross-firm  variance  in productivity  levels is high in developing  countries-e.g., Pack
(1988),  Evenson  and Westphal  (1995),  Blomstrom  and Kokko  (1997). Nonetheless,  table
3 suggests  that average  deviations  from the efficient  frontier  are not typically  larger than
what we observe  in the industrialized  countries.  The standard  methodology,  when it
"works,"  yields  mean technical  efficiency  levels  around 60 to 70 percent  of the best prac-
tice frontier  in both regions.  Hence it is hard to reconcile  the studies  surveyed  with the
view that LDC markets  are relatively  tolerant  of inefficient  firms. 23
One exception  is Biggs et al (1995),  who report an unusually  large  amount of
productivity  dispersion  in Ghana,  Zimbabwe  and Kenya.  However,  these  results are based
on relatively  broadly-defined  industries,  so they  may be a simple  consequence  of aggre-
gation  bias. In a particularly  detailed  study,  Pack (1987)  finds average  deviations  among
Kenyan  textiles  producers  comparable  to those  in other  studies,  even  though his method-
ology  is based  on deterministic  frontiers. Similarly,  Page (1980)  finds dispersion  levels
typical  of other countries  in his early study of Ghana.
u Measurement  problems  make  this finding  all the more  remarkable.  Noisy data-due  to high and  variable
inflation  cum  historic  cost accounting-is likely  to be more  of a problem  in LDCs,  and this should  exag-
gerate  measured  productivity  dispersion  there.
19Although  the studies  summarized  in Table  3 do not support  the notion  that the
productivity  dispersion  is relatively  marked  in LDCs,  most of them are based  on out-
dated  methodologies.  With a few exceptions,  they rely on of the skewness  of the produc-
tion function  residuals  to identify  efficiency  dispersion,  and they are based on cross-
sectional  data. Further,  output is usually  measured  as real revenue,  making  distinctions
between  profitability  and physical  productivity  impossible.  Better data, and studies  that
exploit recent  methodological  developments-especially related  to panel-based  tech-
niques-are  needed  to resolve  the issue. Progress  in measuring  the cumulative  costs of
productivity  gains,  including  training  programs,  technology  purchases,  and R&D efforts,
would  also be welcome.
C.  Plant and Job Turnover in LDCs
The literature  on plant and  job turnover  may  be a better  place  to look for evidence
on the strength  of competitive  pressures  in the LDCs. If extensive  regulation  and taxation
combine  with credit  market  problems  to keep small firms  from challenging  their en-
trenched  larger competitors,  we should  observe  few firms  graduating  from informal  to
formal  status,  and markets shares  should  be relatively  stable among  the larger firms.
Using consecutive  manufacturing  surveys  or censuses,  a handful  of studies  have
documented  entry  rates, exit rates,  net job creation  and net job destruction  among  the
population  of plants with at least 10 workers.  Most firms  above the 10  worker  threshold
participate  wholly or partly in the formal  sector  (e.g.,  Klein and Tokman,  1996).24  Hence
2 4 At that scale,  it is quite  difficult  to avoid detection  by the government  and the costs of forgoing  business
dealings  with other  formal  firms and creditors  are substantial.
20the entry rates  reported  in these studies  give us a crude  sense for rates of graduation  from
informal  status,  and the job turnover  rates reported  give  us a crude sense  for the stability
of market shares  among  larger  firms.
Surprisingly,  although  Cox-Edwards  (1993,  p. ii) argues  that Latin  American
countries  "have  a long tradition  of trying  to protect employment  stability,"  there appears
to be more  job and plant turnover  in these developing  countries  than others  have found in
the United  States  and Canada  (Roberts  and Tybout, 1996).25  For Chile and Colombia,
plant turnover  figures  range from 15 to 20 percent,  and the United  States,  they range  be-
26f tween 8 and 13 percent  (Dunne,  Roberts  and Samuelson,  1988).  In terms of job creation
and  job destruction,  Chile (1979-86)  and Colombia  (1977-91)  average  25 and 27 percent
annual  turnover  rates, respectively,  while  the United  States (1973-86)  and Canada  (1973-
86) both average  around 20 percent (Roberts,  1996,  table 2.1). So, at least  in these rela-
tively advanced  developing  countries,  turnover  is as vigorous  as in OECD  countries.
Outside  Latin  America,  some  analysts  have found even  more flux in plants and
jobs. In Morocco  (1984-89),  the annual  manufacturing  job turnover  rate was 31 percent,
and the average  of the entry  and exit rate was roughly 10  percent (Roberts  and Tybout,
25 Among  other  distinctive  features,  Cox-Edwards  notes  that "The  Latin  American  legislation,  with  a few
exceptions,  including  Mexico,  is very strict  in limiting  the use of temporary  contracts  ...  firms  cannot rely
on a mix of permanent  and  temporary  labor  force,  as is the case in Japan  and increasingly  the United  States
. . ." (p. 14). Hence  it is difficult  to avoid  severance  payments  by relying  on temporary  workers.  On the
other  hand, as Cox-Edwards  emphasizes,  severance  payments  are often  legally  tied  to number  of years on
the job, so, subject  to the temporary  worker  constraints, firms may  be encouraged  to "maintain  a very
young  work  force  with  high rotation. . ." (p. iii)
26 Figures  for Chile and Colombia  are obtained  by aggregating  the shares  of year-specific  cohorts  in tables
9.5 and 10.4  of Roberts  and Tybout  (1996). It must be kept in mind  that these  figures  are biased downward
because  plants  with less  than 10  workers  are excluded  from the analysis.
211996). Plant turnover rates are still higher in Taiwan. There, one third to one-haif  of
manufacturing production in 1991 originated from firms that were created after 1986
(Aw, Chen and Roberts, 1997). Finally, studying micro and small enterprises in Africa,
Liedholm and Mead (1995) find that turnover rates among micro and small enterprises
are very high, ranging from 19 to 25 percent per annum.
In short, the turnover studies available for LDCs suggest that larger firms are rou-
tinely challenged by newly founded firms or firms crossing the 10 worker threshold, and
that the market shares of formal sector firms are less secure than they are in the OECD.
Why is there so much flux in the LDCs?  In some cases-especially  in Latin America-it
partly reflects relatlively  the dramatic business cycles found there.  But even if one fo-
cuses on the minimum of the entry rate and the exit rate, turnover is relatively rapid in the
developing countries (Roberts and Tybout, 1996).
Another part of the explanation lies with Engel effects and low levels of human
capital, which encourage turnover by skewing the output mix toward simple products
with relatively low start-up costs, like baked foods, footwear, apparel, and metal prod-
ucts. The dominance of these sectors and technologies is probably amplified by macro
uncertainty, which creates incentives to be flexible in terms of capacity. Finally, the ex-
traordinary turnover rate in Taiwan may trace partly to the ease with which sub-
contracting arrangements can be made, and the low entry costs that result (Levy, 1990).
Of course, the turnover studies discussed above are less than definitive. Entry
rates simply indicate the rate at which plants with at least 10 workers appear, and job
turnover rates don't reveal which plants in the population are expanding and contracting.
22It is possible  that nearly  all of this flux takes place  among  plants in the 10-50  worker
range, and that these  moderately  small  producers  never  seriously  challenge  the larger,
entrenched  incumbents.
Nonetheless,  the available  evidence  suggests  that  this is not the case. For example,
in Indonesia,  establishments  with 500 or more employees  accounted  for 56 percent  of to-
tal manufacturing  employment  in 1990,  but nearly  half of this figure was attributable  to
plants  that had begun  as small and medium  enterprises  (Steel, 1993).  In Sub-Saharan  Af-
rica, while the vast majority of small enterprises remain small,  . . .among  those enter-
prises currently  employing  10-50  workers,  about  half started  with less than five workers
and subsequently  grew."  (Liedholm  and Mead, 1995,  p. 44).27  There is also evidence  that
Colombian  metalworking  firms born with less than 5 workers  grew substantially  more
28 rapidly  than the larger incumbents  (Cortes  et al, 1987).
The finding  that some  micro enterprises  make  their way up the size distribution  is
consistent  with Levenson  and Maloney's (1997)  vision of the informal  sector. Rather
than a residual  labor  pool created  by workers  rationed  out of formal  jobs, they see it as a
seedbed  for formal  sector  firms,  with the most efficient  entrepreneurs  voluntarily  choos-
ing to submit  to taxation  and regulation  in order  to access  the services  they need  for ex-
pansion: formal  credit  markets,  the legal system,  and publicly  administered  fringe  bene-
fits for their workers.
27 Unfortunately  these figures  describe  both  retail  and manufacturing  activities,  which  are difficult  to dis-
tinguish  among  very small  firms.
28  However,  this finding  partly  reflects  the fact  that firms  that failed  were not included  in the study.
23In addition  to studies  of more countries,  the literature  on turnover  could  be use-
fully extended  by moving  beyond entry/exit  rates,  and estimating  year-to-year  transition
matrices  that describe  probabilities  of movement  from any size class (including  non-
existence)  to any other. If there are size thresholds  that are relatively  difficult  to cross in
particular  LDCs,  this should  show  up in international  comparisons.
D.  Turnover  and productivity  growth
High turnover  does not, in itself, imply that inefficient  producers  are rapidly
driven from the market.  For example,  when  the Argentine  exchange  rate regime collapsed
in the early 1  980s,  it left many firms  with dollar-denominated  debt in serious  trouble,  and
the resulting  exit patterns  had little to do with productivity  (Swanson  and Tybout, 1988).
It is thus interesting  to inquire  whether  turnover-based  productivity  gains  are present.
In Chile and Colombia,  as in developed  countries,  exiting  plants are substantially
less productive  than incumbents  (Liu  and Tybout,  1996,  Liu, 1993,  and Tybout 1992b).
Similarly,  Taiwanese  plants  which  will exit in the next five years exhibit  below-average
efficiency  (Aw,  Chen  and Roberts, 1997),  and the productivity  of exiting  Chilean  plants
begins  to deteriorate  several  years before  they actually  disappear  (Liu, 1993)-a  phe-
nomenon  that Griliches  and Regev  (1995)  dubbed  the "shadow  of death"  effect  in their
study of Israeli  turnover.  So there is evidence  that a shakedown  process  is at work.
However,  in Chile and Colombia,  entering  plants are also less productive  than
incumbents  on average.  Further,  neither  entrants  nor dying  plants account  for more than 5
24percent of total output in a typical year.29  So inefficient plants are being replaced with
plants that are only slightly more efficient, and neither group is a source of much produc-
tion. This implies that, if the turnover process were suddenly arrested, the impact on pro-
ductivity in the first year would initially be small.
Nonetheless, over time the costs of policies that prevent turnover quickly mount
for several reasons.  First, the "shadow of death" effect suggests that exiting plants are on
a downward trajectory, and might well continue to get worse.  Second, entering cohorts
typically undergo a shake-down period in which the least efficient entrants drop out and
the survivors quickly improve their productivity. Liu and Tybout (1996) find that this
process brings the average productivity of new cohorts up to industry-wide norms after
three or four years in Colombia, and Aw, Chen and Roberts (1997) find similar catch-up
patterns in Taiwan, although the process is not complete there after 5 years in some indus-
tries. Finally,  although the firms turning over account for a small share of production in
any one year, the cumulative effects of turnover on the population of plants quickly
mount.
The longer term effects of turnover are documented by Aw, Chen and Roberts
(1997), who report that after a five year period, the replacement of low productivity
plants with new, higher productivity plants accounted for one-half or more of the TFP
growth in many Taiwanese industries. Comparisons with Chile, Colombia and the U.S.
are difficult because the results depend upon methodology and time horizon. Nonetheless,
29 The low average  productivity  of entering  plants might  seem  at odds  with the results  I discussed  earlier
which  suggested  small  plants are not much less  efficient  than large  ones. These  two findings  are not con-
tradictory  because,  while most new plants are small,  most small  plants  are not new.
25crude calculations suggest that turnover-based productivity growth has been exception-
ally high in Taiwan, and that easy entry and exit help account for that country's remark-
able progress in the past 30 years. 30
E.  Concentration and market power
Unlike studies on productivity dispersion and turnover, industrial concentration
studies often suggest that big firms in LDCs enjoy more market power than their counter-
parts in the developed countries. 31 This reading of the evidence makes sense if cross-
country variation in the market shares of the largest firms is generated by associated
variation in entry barriers, or if variation in concentration-due  to exogenous country-
specific factors like mnarket  size-affects  the sustainability of collusive arrangements.
Simulations of an industrial evolution model with non-competitive market structures ver-
ify that when countries differ for these reasons, concentration is positively related to mar-
ket power and monopoly rents (Pakes and McGuire, 1994).
However, even when firms are price takers and entry barriers are held constant,
Hopenhayn's industrial evolution model predicts that concentration is inversely related to
market size. So high concentration in the LDCs need not mean that monopoly power is
greater there; it may simply reflect the fact that markets are smaller. (In Latin America,
two-thirds of the variation in industrial concentration measures is explained-by the loga-
30 Taking  a weighted  average  of industry-specific  results,  one may calculate  that the productivity  gains
from replacing  exiting  plants with  entering  plants was 3.2  percent over  a five year period  in Taiwan.  The
(roughly)  comparable  figure  from Colombia  is 2.2 percent.
31 Lee  (1992) surveys  the empirical  literature  on concentration  in LDCs  so I will not repeat  the exercise
here.  Theorists  have also  been  known  to view  high concentration  in the LDCs  as signalling  relatively  un-
competitive  markets  there  (Krugman,  1989,  Rodrik, 1988).
26rithm of GDP  alone.32)  Further,  the relatively  large  mark-ups  of large  firms-which  are
found in both the OECD  and the LDCs-can  be interpreted  in the context of industrial
evolution  models  as reflecting  their relatively  efficiency.
If we eschew  concentration  ratios as signals  of market  power,  what other  evidence
is available?  Some  studies  have looked  for market  power  using Schmalensee's  (1985)
methodology,  which " .. . amounts  to asking  whether  cross-plant  variations  [in price-cost
margins]  are due to industry-wide  effects  or to plant-specific  market shares. Efficient
plants should  be larger and have higher  profits, so a positive  correlation  is generally  ex-
pected  between  market  shares  and price-cost  margins,  regardless  of whether  firms have
market  power. 33 If the degree  of market  power varies  across  product  groups  [due  to entry
barriers],  industry  dunmmies  pick up this source  of difference  in plant-level  profitability"
(Roberts  and Tybout, 1996,  p. 196).  There are many problems  with this methodology  too,
including  the poor correspondence  between  price-cost  margins  and economic  profits
(Fisher  and McGowan,  1983).  But taken at face value,  the results  for Chile,  Colombia,
and Morocco  show  no more evidence  of market  power  than Schmalensee  (1985)  found in
the United  States (Roberts  and Tybout, 1996).34
32This  is the r2 one obtains  using Mellor's (1978)  concentration  measures,  which  were constructed  the
same  way for 10 Latin  American  countries  using  their industrial  census  data. A number  of studies  have
commented  on the negative  correlation  between  market  size and concentration-Lee's (1992) survey  pro-
vides  further  details.
33  Demsetz  (1973)  was an early advocate  of this argument,  later  it was formalized  in the industrial  evolu-
tion literature  that I mention  in section  IV.A  above.
34  The country  studies  in Roberts  and Tybout  (1996)  did find  that  the time series  correlation  between  mar-
gins and import  penetration  (trade  barriers)  was largest  negative  (positive)  among  big firms,  suggesting  that
they are most directly  in competition  with  foreign  suppliers.
27The above  notvithstanding,  it would  be foolish  to conclude  that market  power is
not an issue in developing  countries.  For example,  in Chile and Colombia  during  the
1  970s, a handful  of closely  held conglomerates  controlled  large shares  of certain  indus-
tries, as well as portions  of the financial  sector  (Dahse, 1979;  Superintendencia  de So-
ciedades,  1978).  Countries  that privatize  natural monopolies  should  also be on gaurd,
needless  to say.  The methodologies  I have discussed  here give  one a general  sense for the
extent of competition,  but they are unlikely  to detect  the pockets  of non-competitve  be-
havior that result from these  conditions.  Careful  case studies  that collect  detailed  price
data and monitor  the behavior  of the individual  players  are probably  the only means
through  which  convincing  conclusions  can be reached.
F.  The bottom linie
To summarize,  because  of institutional  entry  barriers,  poorly  functioning  financial
markets,  and limited  domestic  demand,  the industrial  sectors  of developing  countries  are
often described  as insulated  oligopolies.  This characterization  does  not seem  to fit the
countries  where  turnover  studies  have  been done. To the contrary,  turnover  is substantial,
unexploited  scale  economies  are modest,  and evidence  of widespread  monopoly  rents is
lacking.
Nonetheless,  at least  three caveats  apply. The first is that turnover  studies  have
not been  done in the economies  most famous  for excessive  regulation-India, Peru and
various  countries  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  come to mind. Countries  where  public  enter-
prises are common  in the manufacturing  sector  are also missing  from the existing  body of
28evidence.  Second,  the comparisons  that are available-relatively unfettered  Taiwan  with
moderately  controlled  Colombia  and Morocco-suggest that  policies  affecting  turnover
may have had a substantial  impact  on efficiency  and productivity  growth.  Finally,  mo-
nopoly  power  that is localized  in one or several  industries  is unlikely  to reveal  itself in the
type  of study  I have surveyed  here.
Obviously,  further  documentation  of the facts is needed, not only to extend  the
variety  of countries  studied,  but  to delve into details,  and to better  control  for cross-
country  differences  in survey  coverage  and industry-mix.  In addition,  there is a need  for
studies  that relate  policy  to welfare.  This will require  estimating  and calibrating  structural
models  of industrial  evolution  for the LDCs-an  endeavor  that researchers  are only be-
ginning  to pursue  in the industrialized  countries  (Pakes  and McGuire,  1994;  Hopenhayn
and Rogerson,  1993).
V.  TRADE  PROTECTION,  MARKET  STRUCTURE  AND PRODUCTIVITY
Although  competition  in developing  countries  may  be vigorous,  it is nonetheless
imperfect.  Entry  and exit costs  matter,  and products  are differentiated.  Further,  even  when
the resulting  market  power  is minimal,  learning spillovers  and other  externalities  are
surely  present  in some  form.  Hence protectionist  trade policies,  where  they still exist,
may  do more than affect  domestic  relative  prices and inter-sectoral  resource  alloca-
tion-they  may change  intra-industry  mark-ups,  productivity,  or productivity  growth. In
this section,  after briefly  recounting  the relevant  theoretical  literature,  I consider  the firm-
level econometric  evidence  on each  possible  effect.
29A.  The Possible ]Effects  of Trade Policy
Static arguments: There are numerous static arguments why trade protection
might affect the performance of domestic firms in LDCs. Most involve the effects of
trade policy on the competitive pressures that these firms face, the size of the market that
they operate in, or both. Firms' responses often depend upon whether entry and exit bar-
riers are substantial, whether scale economies-internal  or external-are  important, and
whether protection takes the form of tariffs or quantitative restrictions. 
35
I will limit myself to several examples. Consider a tradeable goods industry with
substantial entry barriers, composed of Cournot-competing firms. If the industry has zero
net exports under free trade, the main effect of import prohibitions is to eliminate the
threat of foreign competition. Domestic firms may exploit their enhanced market power
by curtailing production and increasing their price-cost mark-ups, perhaps sacrificing
some scale efficiency in the process.
On the other hEmd,  if the industry begins from substantial import penetration, the
dominant effect of protection may be to increase the market size for domestic producers.
Firms are likely to respond by expanding, perhaps exploiting scale economies as they do
so. (Mark-ups may still rise.) In either scenario, the higher profits that result from protec-
tion may allow relatively inefficient firms to survive, driving up productivity dispersion.
Alternatively, if we drop the assumption of prohibitive entry barriers-which  seems sen-
35 Many  of the relevant  models  are summarized  in Helpman  and Krugman  (1985)  and a number  of the
seminal  contributions  are collected  in Grossman  (1992).
30sible,  given our findings  in section  IV-the  higher profits  may eventually  entice  new, in-
efficiently  small domestic  producers  to enter  (Krugman,  1979).36
External  economies  of scale further  expand  the list of possible  effects  of trade
policy on productivity.  Suppose,  for example,  that the external  economies  occur  at the
industry  level,  and are national  rather  than global.  37 Then the net effect  of trade liberali-
zation depends  upon which sectors  expand  and which  contract,  as well as the magnitude
of traditional  gains  from comparative  advantage  effects.  It is possible  that the losses can
outweigh  the gains  (e.g.,  Helpman  and Krugman,  1985,  chapter  3).
Finally,  when employee  effort  is a choice  variable,  trade policy  can affect  the
amount  of "managerial  slack" or "X-inefficiency"  among  manufacturers.  The dominant
view among  development  economists  is that protection  induces  managers  in import-
competing  industries  to relax and enjoy the "quiet life." In early  versions of the argument,
protection  increases  profits  among  domestic  firms.  This relaxes  the consumption-leisure
budget  constraint  that their managers  face, who  respond  by choosing  more of both if they
are on the backward-bending  portion  of their labor supply  schedule  (Corden,  1974).  In
more recent  treatments,  protection  affects  the payment  schedule  that owners  (principals)
must offer  to managers  (agents)  to induce  them to reveal  their "type." 38 If the cost to
36 Head  and  Reis  (1997)  summarize  the  analytical  and  empirical  literature  on  trade  liberalization  and  the
size  distribution  of firms,  while providing  some new evidence  from Canada.
37 Industrial  expansion  generally  deepens  the market  for specialized  labor, material  inputs,  and networked
support  services.  Thus,  even if no technology  spillovers  take place, external  scale  economies  at the industry
level  may be present  when  there are increasing  returns  to scale in the production  of these  inputs,  or when
risk-averse  specialized  workers  prefer regions  with  many  job opportunities  (e.g., Rivera-Batiz  and Rivera-
Batiz, 1990;  Stewart  and Ghani,  1992).
38 Managers  differ in their endowed  abilities,  and choose  their effort levels  in response  to the reward  struc-
ture and market  conditions.  By  the revelation  principle,  contracts  that induce  managers  to be truthful  about
their (unobservable)  abilities  yield at least  as high  a value  to the owner  as any other  mechanism.
31owners of truthful revelation rises with protection, they may opt for equilibria at lower
output and effort levels, but the effect of protection on effort is sensitive to modeling de-
tails (e.g., Vousden and Campbell, 1994).
Dynamic arguments: Further effects of trade policy on performance have been
demonstrated in explicitly dynamic frameworks. Again, most anything can happen, de-
pending upon modeling assumptions and the particular policy. One issue that has at-
tracted attention is whether trade protection will induce technologically backward pro-
ducers to invest in catching up. In theory it may, if it increases the effective market size
and the associated pay-off from marginal cost reductions for domestic firms (Miyagiwa
and Ohno, 1995, and Itodrik, 1992). On the other hand, protection may facilitate collu-
sion among domestic producers and induce them to collectively stick with backward
technologies (Rodrik, 1992). A modest permanent quota may also delay technology
adoption because, with continuously binding quantity constraints, foreign suppliers do
not cut back their shipments to the domestic market when the home finm becomes more
efficient (Miyagiwa and Ohno, 1995).
Catch-up models describe a one-time transition from dated to new technologies,
but they do not link trade policies to ongoing productivity growth.  For that, theorists
have developed general equilibrium frameworks with continual knowledge production
and diffusion. In such models, protection changes the relative prices of the inputs in-
volved in product development, it affects the set of imported products that innovators
compete with, and it aflfects  the ease with domestic innovators can access foreign techni-
cal expertise.
32Whether protection reduces ongoing productivity growth in these models depends
partly upon the way in which knowledge diffuses (inter alia). 39 Suppose that trade policy
does not affect the ease with which foreign knowledge can be accessed, perhaps because
it is readily available over the internet. Further, suppose that to build domestic know-how
in LDCs, there is no substitute for learning-by-doing in the high-tech sectors and the
spillovers it generates. Then trade protection may improve productivity growth and wel-
fare if it promotes the high-tech activities that generate the highest learning rates and the
most valuable spillovers. 40
On the other hand, if domestic producers acquire some of their knowledge
through exposure to foreign clients, technologically sophisticated imports, or knowledge-
able competitors, protection may slow growth by constricting important channels of
knowledge transmission (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Chap. 6). Similar com-
ments apply to policies that discourage foreign direct investment if the local presence of
multinational plants facilitates technology diffusion.
Overall, the most striking conclusion that emerges from the analytical literature
discussed above is that almost anything can happen when a country protects its manufac-
turers, depending upon the assumptions one invokes. Hence many empiricists have in-
vestigated patterns of association between trade policy, pricing behavior, productivity,
39Another  key issue  is the strength  of spillover  effects. Diffusion  of knowledge  through  technology  pur-
chases  or licensing  agreements  is not enough  to establish  a link  between  steady  state growth  and trade
policies. Knowledge  spillovers  are typically  needed,  and they must be strong  enough  that  the private  return
to innovation  does not fall with increases  in the stock  of knowledge  (Jones, 1995).
40  Although  they have not endorsed  it, this argument  for protection  has been  formalized  by Krugman
(1987),  Stokey  (1988),  Young  (1991) and  Grossman  and Helpman  (1991).
33and productivity growth. Others have attempted to chip away at ambiguities by asking
which modeling assumrrptions  best describe the data. Let us now consider the evidence.
B.  Openness and Pricing  Behavior: The Evidence
One of the more robust results on trade with imperfect competition is that policies
that constrain imports tend to increase the market power of domestic producers. To look
for evidence of this phenomenon, many researchers have regressed price-cost margins on
proxies for import competition or trade protection, usually looking across industries at a
point in time.41 The correlation between import penetration (trade protection) and margins
is typically negative (positive), and the typical interpretation is that foreign competition
squeezes monopoly rents, or "disciplines" the pricing behavior of domestic producers.
In a variant on this theme, a number of authors have recently used Hall's (1988)
methodology for measuring mark-ups to gauge the effects of import competition on
pricing behavior.42  The typical study regresses output growth on a share-weighted aver-
age of input growth rates, and interprets the coefficient on input growth to be a monotonic
function of the price-cost mark-up. Allowing the coefficient to shift with trade liberaliza-
tion, these studies typically find that openness is associated with reductions in price-cost
margins, and they interpret this to support the "import discipline" hypothesis. 43
41 Lee  (1992) surveys  this literature.
42  Levinsohn  (1993),  Harrison  (1994),  Foroutan  (1996)  and Krishna  and Mitra  (1997) study  Turkey,  Cote
d'Ivoire,  Turkey  (again),  and India, respectively.
43 This methodology  is likely  to suffer  from simultaneity  bias  because  transitory  productivity  shocks  appear
in  the disturbance  term, and are likely  to be correlated  with  input  growth.  Appropriate  instruments  are
nearly  impossible  to find (Albbott,  Griliches  and Hausman,  1989).
34However,  even  if one ignores  the econometric  problems,  other interpretations  are
possible.  Suppose  that increased  import-penetration  reflects real exchange  rate apprecia-
tion, which squeezes  output  prices relative  to input prices in the tradeable  goods indus-
tries. In the short  run, so long as revenues still  cover variable  costs, all
firms-competitive or otherwise-will produce  at lower  margins  and the competitive
sectors  will make negative  economic  profits. Alternatively,  suppose  that heightened  im-
port penetration  reflects  the removal  of trade barriers.  Then relative  prices have been
twisted  in favor  of exportables  and against  importables. Stolper-Samuelson  effects
should  drive down  the relative  price of the input  used intensively  by the import-
competing  sectors,  which is likely  to be capital  in the developing  countries.  Similarly,  in
cross  sectional  studies,  suppose  that protection  is attracted  to the industries  in the coun-
try's comparative  disadvantage,  which  are likely  to be capital  intensive.  These same in-
dustries  should  exhibit  relatively  high price-cost  margins  simply  because  relatively  large
amounts  of capital  are used  per unit output.
C.  Openness  and Productivity  Levels: The Evidence
Industries  with falling  trade protection  often exhibit  falling dispersion  cum grow-
ing average  efficiency  (Nishimizu  and Page, 1982;  Tybout  et al, 1991;  Tybout  and West-
brook, 1995;  Harrison,  1996).  Similarly,  protected  industries  tend to exhibit heightened
productivity  dispersion  (Haddad,  1993;  Haddad  and Harrison,  1993).  The standard  inter-
pretation  of these results is that the forces  of foreign  competition  drive inefficient  domes-
tic producers  to exploit scale economies,  eliminate  waste,  adopt best practice  technolo-
gies, or shut down.
35However,  a nunmber  of caveats  apply. First, simultaneity  bias creates  the usual
problems.  Inefficient,  influential  firms often  lobby  for protection,  and sometimes  they
succeed.  Further,  as already  discussed,  in most firm-level  data sets output is measured  as
revenue  divvided  by an indusry-wide  deflator.  So reductions  in measured  "productivity"
dispersion  may simply  mean that mark-ups  have fallen  the most among  firms  with the
largest  initial margins.  That is, when efficiency  is equated  with low dispersion-as  it is in
the efficiency  frontier  literature-  improvements  in productivity  cannot  be distinguished
from the mark-up  squeeze  often associated  with trade liberalization.  Conversely,  if trade
liberalization  is associated  with a major devaluation,  the favorable  twist in prices for
tradeables  should  increase  their profitability,  at least in the short  run. This looks  just like
productivity  gains  if physical  units of output cannot  be observed.
Going  beyond  the association  between  efficiency  and openness,  a number  of
authors  have attempted  to determine  why  the two are correlated.  There is some  evidence
that internal  scale  effects  are not the main reason. If trade liberalization  forces  ineffi-
ciently  small firms  down  their cost curves,  one should  observe  plant sizes rising in im-
port-competing  sectors  rise as protection  is removed.  However,  micro panel studies  con-
sistently  find that increases  in import  penetration  are associated  with reductions  in plant
size,  as are reductions  in protection  (Dutz, 1996;  Roberts  and Tybout,  1991;  Tybout  and
Westbrook,  1995).  Thus,  liberalization  may  work against scale  efficiency,  at least in the
short  run. The impact  on efficiency  of these plant size adjustments  is probably small,
however,  since  adjustments  take place  mainly among  large plants that are operating  in the
constant  returns  range of their cost curves  (Tybout  and Westbrook,  1995).
36Although  external  scale economies  are probably  present,  they too are unlikely  to
account  for large  protection-related  efficiency  effects.  Using plant-level  panel data and
the methodology  developed  by Caballero  and Lyons  (1990),  Krizan  (1997)  finds signifi-
cant external  returns  to scale  in many Moroccan  industries.44  He then embeds  his esti-
mates in a computable  general  equilibrium  model  of Morocco  developed  by Rutheford,
Rustrom  and Tarr (1993) and simulates  the effects  of trade liberalization  vis a vis
Europe.  His findings  imply that external  economies  compound  the gains  from liberaliz-
ing, but the effects  are quite small. 45 Further,  to obtain  large  efficiency  gains or losses  one
would  have to assume  implausibly  large external  returns.
In sum, when trade liberalization  improves  productive  efficiency,  it is probably
largely  due to intra-plant  improvements  that are unrelated  to internal  or external  scale
economies.  The elimination  of waste, reductions  in managerial  slack,  heightened  incen-
tives for technological  catch-up,  and access to better intermediate  and capital  goods are
all possible  explanations,  but there is little direct evidence  on the importance  of any of
these. Detailed  analysis  of task-level  efficiency  and technological  choice  within narrowly
defined  industries-before and after a major change  in trade policy-is  probably  the most
promising  direction  for further  work on the topic. 46
44  Other  evidence  that  external  scale  effects  are  present  comes  from  the  locational  choices  of  new  firms
(e.g.,  Henderson  and  Kuncoro,  1996).
4  In the scenario  with  the largest  externality  effects,  the positive  effects  of trade liberalization  on welfare
increase  from  a .9 percent  gain to a 1.1  percent gain.
46  Pack (1987)  and Mody et al (1991)  provide  excellent  examples  of research  at this level of detail, but
neither  study  directly  examines  the  link  between  performance  and  trade  reforms.
37D.  Openness and ]Productivity  Growth: The Evidence
Static and dynamic effects of trade policy are conceptually distinct in that the lat-
ter involve a time dimension.  However, all responses to policy take time, even those that
can be analytically described without a dynamic model. Given the short time periods
spanned by micro data, it thus is rarely possible to distinguish transitory one-shot adjust-
ments in productivity levels from lasting changes in the rate of productivity growth.
Hence, to assess the relevance of the dynamic analytical models I mentioned in part A, I
will limit my discussion to the issue of how technology diffuses.
Technology transfers through trade Other things equal, outward-oriented policies
are more likely to facilitate long-run growth if technology diffuses through international
transactions. For example, LDCs may acquire new technologies by de-engineering im-
ports, or simply by deploying the innovative intermediate and capital goods that they ac-
quire in foreign markets. They may also learn about product design and new technologies
or management techniques from the foreign buyers to whom they export. Once acquired
through these channels, new foreign technologies may diffuse to other domestic firms not
directly engaged in trade. Are these processes important?
There is very little micro-econometric evidence on the productivity enhancing ef-
fects of importing sophisticated intermediate and capital goods, although the fact that
LDCs import most of their machinery speaks for itself.  Several studies do report a posi-
tive correlation between access to imported intermediate goods and performance
(Handoussa, et al, 1986; Tybout and Westbrook, 1995), and Feenstra et al (1992) report
evidence that Korean firms improved their productivity by diversifying their input bun-
38dies. Thus imported  capital  and intermediate  goods  may be the most important  channel
through  which trade diffuses  technology,  but clearly,  further  work is needed  to quantify
the effects.
More detailed  evidence  is available  on technology  acquisition  through  exporting.
In support  of a "learning  by exporting"  effect,  most studies  that compare  the productivity
of LDC exporters  with that of others  in the same industry  and country  find that exporters
do better. 47 But it is not difficult  to write down  a model  in which  firms  that are relatively
efficient-perhaps for the reasons  described  in the industrial  evolution  literature-self-
select  into foreign  markets. Hence  the cross-sectional  correlation  between  exporting  and
efficiency  may  reflect causality  in either  direction,  or both.
Several  recent studies  attempt  to address  the causality  issue by tracking  firms
through  time and asking,  first, whether  those that  became  exporters  were more efficient
beforehand,  and second,  whether  exporters  showed  improvement  relative  to industry
norms  after entering  foreign  markets.  Most find  that exporters  were substantially  more
efficient  than non-exporters  before they started  selling  abroad,  so the higher efficiency  of
exporters  appears  to be at least  partly a self-selection  effect. 48 These  studies also find
that, in most industries,  the efficiency  gap between  exporters  and non-exporters  does  not
grow  over time, suggesting  that learning  is not a general  phenomenon.  However,  firms  in
47 This  result  is  reported  in Aw  and  Hwang  (1995);  Aw  and  Batra  (1998);  Chen  and  Tang  (1987);  Haddad
(1993);  Handoussa,  Nishimizu  and Page (1986);  Tybout  and Westbrook  (1995);  and Aw, Chen  and Rob-
erts  (1997). See,  however,  Sinha  (1993).
"Clerides,  Lach and Tybout  (forthcoming)  report this result  for Colombia,  Mexico  and Morocco; Aw,
Chen  and Roberts  (1997)  find the same  pattern  in Taiwan.  Both sets  of findings  are consistent  with  those
that Bernard  and Jensen  (1996)  report in a related  study  of U.S.  exporters.
39several industries do exhibit relative efficiency gains after becoming exporters, so the
learning-by-exporting hypothesis cannot be ruled out entirely. 49
Regardless of whether they acquire their expertise from abroad, technology may
also diffuse from exporters to non-exporters in the same country, region or industry
through demonstration effects, skilled worker training (and subsequent labor turnover), or
expertise imparted to their local suppliers. Looking at.the intensity of exporting activity
through time, Clerides et al (forthcoming) find that when many firms have been export-
ing from a particular r  egion, all firms in that region tend to enjoy lower average costs.
Spillovers are one interpretation, but this finding may simply reflect the fact that regions
with cheap labor or materials are attractive export platforms. 50
technology transfer through FDI  Even if they are not innovative themselves,
multinational (MNC) affiliates in LDCs may transfer expertise to locally held firms
through the same diffuision  channels I mentioned in connection with exporters. Indeed,
FDI does seem to bring relatively efficient technologies into host countries: most studies
find that foreign-owned firms are more productive than their domestically owned com-
petitors.5' But it is unclear how extensively these technologies diffuse among domesti-
49 Kraay  (1997) and Bigsten  et al (1997) also  find that firms  become  more  efficient  relative  to others  after
becoming  exporters  in China  and sub-Sharan  Africa,  respectively.  However,  because  of data limitations,
their econometric  models  are relatively  restrictive.  In particular,  since  the auto-regressive  process  generat-
ing average  costs is constrained  to be first-order,  the effects of more  distant cost lags  may be coming
through  their lagged  exporting  dummies. (Clerides  et al, forthcoming,  find that cost  processes  are second
or third order in Morocco  and  Colombia.)
50 A different  kind  of productivity  spillover  from exporters  occurs  if their activities  ease  the way for
other  firms to break into foreign  markets.  Demonstration  effects and  the development  of specialized  sup-
port services  like  port facilitates  and intermediaries  are possible  reasons  this might  occur.  Aitken,  et al
(1997)  and Clerides  et al (forthcoming)  report some  evidence  that this phenomenon  is present  in Mexico
and Colombia,  respectivel.y.
51 See,  for example,  Haddad  and Harrison  (1993)  and Sinha  (1993).
40cally owned  firms.  Case studies  suggest  that substantial  diffusion  occurs  (Blomstrom  and
Kokko, 1997).  Further,  firms  in sectors  with relatively  high MNC  presence  tend to be
more  productive  in Uruguay,  Mexico,  Morocco  and Venezuela  (Kokko  et al, 1997,  Had-
dad and Harrison,  1993,  and Aitken  and Harrison,  1994).  On the other hand,  when indus-
try effects  are controlled  for with dummy  variables,  domestically-held  Venezuelan  firms
actually  do worse  as the MNC  presence  in their industry  increases  (Aitken  and Harrison,
1994).  Hence cross-sectional  studies  may suffer from simultaneity  bias because  MNCs
are attracted  to profitable  sectors,  and negative  spillover  effects  may  occur in the short
run because  MNCs  siphon  off domestic  demand  and/or bid away  high quality labor  when
they set up shop  in the host country  (Aitken  and Harrison,  1994).
learning-by-doing  and learning  spillovers  If international  trade is not an impor-
tant conduit  for technology  diffusion,  protection  may facilitate  productivity  growth  by
promoting  domestic  production  in the learning-intensive  sectors.  Is this argument  for
protection  empirically  relevant?  In developing  countries,  technology  acquisition  often
a nounts  to adapting  existing  methods  to local circumstances  (Evenson  and Westphal,
1995).  Hence,  instead  of focusing  narrowly  on R&D or technology  purchases,  the rate at
which  firms generate  knowledge  may be better proxied  by the intensity  with which  they
rely on engineers,  technicians,  and scientists-hereafter ETS employees.  If protection
encourages  learning  and productivity  growth,  one would  thus expect  that it helps ETS-
intensive  firms, and that these firms  exhibit  rapid  productivity  growth and/or  generate
positive spillovers.
41However,  it is not obvious  that productivity  growth  and learning  spillovers  are
greater  among  import-competing  manufacturers  than among  non-tradeables  or export-
oriented  producers.  Arguably,  the best documented  case  of spillovers  in LDCs is the
Green  Revolution.  Further,  within each  industry,  the firms  that export-and thus the
firms  that benefit  from openness-tend to be more skill-intensive  than others  (Batra  ant
Tan, 1997;  Revenga  and Montenegro,  1997;  Clerides  et al, 1998).52
The presumption  that ETS-intensive  firms  exhibit  the most rapid efficiency
growth  is also tenuous.  Firms with high ETS intensity  do tend  to get more output  per unit
bundle  of capital  and labor (e.g.,  Page, 1980  and 1984;  Little et al, 1987;  Cortes,  et al,
1987;  Biggs et al, 1995).  But the fact that ETS workers  are more productive  need not sig-
nal relatively  rapid learning-by-doing,  much less spillovers  from one firm  to another.  In
fact, in Colombia  andi  Morocco,  ETS-intensive  do not exhibit higher  productivity  growth
than other firms  (Hurnt  and Tybout, 1997).
Finally, although  common  sense  and case  studies  tell us that learning  by doing
among  domestic  firms is important,  the available  evidence  suggests  that it complements,
rather than substitute  for, access  to the international  knowledge  stock (Evenson  and
Westphal,  1995;  Basant  and Fikkert, 1996). Hence the case for fostering  growth  by pro-
tecting  learning  industries  seems  weak.
52 This  is true despite  the ifact  that their marginal  production  costs  tend to be lower,  so it appears  that  highly
efficient  firms  hire the most skilled  workers  and, because  they are efficient,  they also  stand to gain the most
from participation  in foreign  markets.
42VII.  SUMMARY
The manufacturing  sectors  of developing  countries  have  traditionally  been rela-
tively  protected.  They have  also been subject  to heavy regulation,  much  of which is bi-
ased in favor  of large enterprises.  Accordingly,  it is often argued  that manufacturers  in
these countries  perform  poorly in several  respects: (1) markets  tolerate  inefficient  firms,
so cross-firm  productivity  dispersion  is high; (2) small groups  of entrenched  oligopolists
exploit  monopoly  power  in product  markets; and (3) many small firms  are unable  or
unwilling  to grow, so important  scale economies  go unexploited.
The size distribution  and the relatively  high concentration  ratios associated  with
LDC manufacturing  are sometimes  interpreted  to support  this position.  However,  these
distinctive  features  may simply  trace to the general  economic  environment.  Small geo-
graphically  diffuse  markets  and a demand  mix skewed  toward  simple consumer  goods
lead naturally  to large numbers  of small plants.
Indeed,  other  signs of problems  that one might associate  with a stagnant,  ineffi-
cient manufacturing  sector  are missing  in the countries  where evidence  is available.
Turnover  rates in plants and  jobs are at least as high as those found in the OECD,  and the
amount  of cross-plant  dispersion  in productivity  rates  is not generally  greater.  Further,
although  small-scale  production  is relatively  common  in LDCs, there do not appear  to be
major  potential  gains  from better  exploitation  of scale economies.
In many  countries,  therefore,  the main manufacturing  sector  problems  may not be
of the variety  that keep firms small,  inhibit  entry and exit, and/or create  market  power.
Rather,  uncertainty  about  policies  and demand  conditions,  poor rule of law, and corrup-
43tion may be the priority  areas for reform. These are certainly  the areas that managers
identify  as most problematic  in qualitative  surveys.
If industries  were perfectly  competitive  in the textbook  sense,  there would  be no
intra-industry  effects  of trade policy  beyond adjustments  in factor  intensities  and relative
prices. Nonetheless,  trade policy  does appear  to affect  intra-industry  performance  at the
margin. There is some  evidence  that mark-ups  fall with liberalization,  while efficiency
rises.  This phenomenon  may reflect  a number  of forces,  but scale economy  exploitation
does not appear  to be among  them. Finally,  although  the link between  trade policy and
long run productivity  growth  has not been clearly  established,  the available  econometric
evidence  suggests  that protecting  "learning"  industries  is unlikely  to foster  productivity
growth.  All of this suggests  that the general  trend toward trade liberalization  has yielded
more benefits  than  the traditional  gains  from trade.
As for future  research,  progress  on a number  of fronts would  seem  especially  use-
ful. First, given  the central  role that endogenous  growth  models  assign  to spillovers,  any
improvement  in our understanding  of their form and magnitude  should  help us to chip
away  at the mystery  of growth.  This will probably  require  new types of surveys  that focus
more directly  on the costs of innovative  activity,  and that track individual  firms over pe-
riods of time long enough to deal with impact  lags. To the extent  that technology  diffu-
sion takes place  throuagh  labor  turnover,  data sets that  merge households  responses  with
those  of their employers  would  also be useful.  Progress  in this arena  is likely  to be grad-
ual and painful.
44Second,  studies  that link behavior  to uncertainty  in the policy  regime  and the
macro  environment  are scarce,  given  the importance  that LDC entrepreneurs  attach to
these phenomena.  These,  too, are often difficult  because  they are inherently  dynamic.  In
the context of models  of entry, exit and investment  they involve  measuring  unobserved
threshold  and adjustment  costs. Nonetheless,  in the wake  recent  theoretical  writings  on
hysteresis  (e.g.,  Dixit and Pyndyck,  1994;  Dixit, 1989;  Baldwin  and Krugman,  1989),
some empirical  work  has begun to emerge.
Finally,  least glamorously,  and perhaps  most importantly,  improvements  in the
quality of data are critical.  Better  measurement  of inputs (including  training,  R&D,  and
other  non-traditional  factors),  outputs,  and prices are needed  if we are to have much  con-
fidence  in findings  on plant-level  productivity  measures,  or simply  to document  the in-
centive  structure  firms  face at the ground level. More attention  to comparability  across
countries  would  also be welcome.  Unfortunately,  the returns  to data collecting  and
cleaning  are very small because  these activities  do not demonstrate  cleverness  to the eco-
nomics  profession  in any obvious sense.  (They are sometimes  interpreted  to demonstrate
the opposite.)  Thus data base building is generally  under-funded,  and in cases where  the
investments  have been  made,  the results  have sometimes  been  jealously guarded  rather
than  disseminated  for widespread  analysis.
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58TABLE 1:  THE DISTRIBUTION  OF EMPLOYMENT  SHARES ACROSS  PLANT  SIZES
Number  of Workers
1-4  5-9  10-19  20-49  50-99  >99
United  States, 1977a  1.18  1.74  3.59  8.74  10.10  74.65
Indonesia,  1986b  44.2  17.3  38.5
Korea, 1973c  7.9  22.0  70.1
India, 1971"  42  20  38
Tanzania,  1967d  56  7  37
Ghana,  1970d  84  1  15
Kenya,  1969d  49  10  41
Sierra  Leone, 1974d  90  5  5
Indonesia,  1977  d  77  7  16
Zambia,  1985d  83  1  16
Honduras,  1979  d  68  8  24
Thailand, 1978d  58  11  31
Philippines,  1974"  66  5  29
Nigeria,  1972d  59  26  15
Jamaica,  1978"  35  16  49
Colombia,  1973  d  52  13  35
Korea, 1975d  40  7  53
Taiwan,  1971  b  29.1  70.8
source: United  States  Bureau  of the Census  (1977).
source:  Steel  (1993)
c source:  Little  et al (1987, Table  6.5)
source:  Liedholm  and Mead  (1987)
59TABLE 2: DETERMINISTIC  FRONTIERS,  AVERAGE  EFFICIENCY  LEVELS BY  INDUSTRY
Little et al (987)  Cortes, et al  Ramaswamy  Corbo and de Melo  Tyler (1979)  Pack (1984),  Page (1980),
or Page (1984),  (1987), Colombia  (1994), India,  (1986), Chile Cobb-  Brazil, Cobb-  relative to UK  Ghana, Cobb-
Industry:  India Translog,  Cobb-Douglas  Cobb-Douglas,  Douglas, linear pro-  Douglas, linear pro-  best practice,  Douglas with
linear prog.  linear prog.  gramming  gramming or quad-  CES (subs. elas-  gamma distribu-
ratic programming  ticity of  0.5)  tion
Food Processing  0.58  0.401
Shoes  0.424  0367
Printing  0.645  0.334
Soap  0.579  0.344
Machine Tools  0.688  0.56  0.432  0.372
Agricultural Ma-  0.349  0.445
chinery
Plastic Products  0.608  0.332  0.48 or 0.65
Steel  0.435  0.57 or 0.62
Motor Vehicles  0.638  0.312
Textiles: Spinning  0.70 (Kenya)
0.225  0.73
(Philippines)
Textiles: Weaving  0.68 (Kenya)
0.55
(Philippines)
Saw Mills  0.370  0.710
Furniture  0.743TABLE 3: STOCHASTIC  FRONTIERS: AVERAGE  TECHNICAL  EFFICIENCY  BY  INDUSTRY  *
Rataswamy  Bhavani  (1991),  Hill and Kalirajan,  Biggs  et al (1995),  Pitt and Lee  Tyler and Lee
(1994), small-  and  small  Indian  firms  (1993), small  In-  Ghana,  Kenya,  Zim-  (1981),  Indone-  (1979),  small and
medium-scale  In-  donesian  finns.  babwe  sian firms**  medium-scale
dian  firms  Colombian  firms
Food  0.67  0.642
Textiles  and Gar-  0.626  0.46  (weaving  only)  0.554 (apparel)
ments  min: 0.618
max: 0.766
Footwear  0.558
Wood  and Furni-  0.42  0.984  (furniture)
ture
Metal  Products  0.719  (structural  0.51  0.987
metal products)
Machine  Tools  0.727  0.704  (agric.  hand
tools only)
Plastic Products  0.820
Motor  Vehicles  0.846
*AIl  figures  are estimates  of E(eu),  where  the inefficiency  measure  u is assumed  to follow  a half-normal  distribution.
** Differences  in estimated  average  efficiency  reflect  differences  in the way that labor  is measured,  and  whether  plant characteristics  like  size and foreign  own-
ership  dummies  are included  in the production  function.TABLE 3: STOCHASTIC  FRONTIERS, con't.*
Caves, et al (1995)  Corbo and de Melo (1986),  Kalirijan and Tse
Chilean firms  [1989], Malaysian
fimns
Food processing  0.713  0.73
Shoes  wrong skewness
Printing  wrong skewness
Soap  0.627
Machine T,  os  wrong skewness
Agricultural Machinery  0.751
Plastic Products  wrong skewness
Motor Vehicles  wrong skewness
Textiles: Spinning  wrong skewness
Textiles: Weaving  wrong skewness
Saw Mills  0.652
Furniture  wrong skewness
Japanese manuf., cross-industry av-  0.699
erage of  144 industries
Korea, cross-industry average of 128  0.672
industries
UK, cross-industry average of  72  0.680
industries
Australia, cross-industry average of  0.699
91 industries
United States, cross-industry average  0.671
of  67 4-digit industries
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